On March 7, 2000, during media frenzy over a visit by George Bush to Bob Jones University (BJU) in his campaign for the presidency, Melinda A. Benton, teaching at Umpqua Community College in Oregon, was notified (as was Umpqua’s president) by Alan Contreras, Administrator of the Oregon Office of Degree Authorization, that it was illegal to use her B.A. and M.A. for any purpose in Oregon, or even to talk about them without a demeaning disclaimer, since they were conferred by BJU, an unaccredited institution. (BJU had never been denied accreditation, but had consistently refused, for religious and other reasons, to seek it.)

It was established in the ensuing court case that Contreras disliked both Bush and BJU.

Contreras threatened to fine Benton $25,000 each time she was caught mentioning one or both of her BJU degrees, and said she might go to jail if she persisted. Despite laudatory reports on her teaching by supervisors and students, Benton lost her Umpqua position for a time, was embarrassed by the widely publicized attack on her competence, and worried that her family would be unable to pay its bills. She considered taking several years of redundant courses in an accredited institution to qualify once again for a teaching position. After an outstanding attorney agreed to fight for her, she alleged in a federal district court that her constitutional rights had been violated (Benton v Svejar/Contreras, U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon, Case Nos. 00-61771-HO and 02-7070-HO, 2003.)

The attorney engaged me as expert witness. I prepared to highlight the foibles of the accreditation, regional in nature, that Contreras was taking (or pretending to take) so seriously.

The initial emphasis of regional accreditors on the number of books in an institution’s library, the nature of the physical facilities, the degrees held by faculty, the budget, and other “input” factors has been extensively lampooned, but the comparatively recent emphasis on “student outcome” evidence of institutional effectiveness raises issues of its own that nobody, to my knowledge, has unraveled. I have seen nowhere in the literature on accreditation in higher education, for instance, any awareness of the voluminous work on how much of the superior achievement of Catholic high school students (versus public high school students) can be attributed to the school itself. If “student outcomes” are what matter above all (I would certainly say so), why not judge competence in teaching and other endeavors by evidence pertaining to it, rather than judging the student (or graduate) by the estimated quality of the institution and then backing up, with even more slippage, by attempting to judge the institution by what its students and graduates know and can do? If we cannot ascertain what individuals know and can do, we certainly cannot ascertain the adequacy of institutions by peering at student knowledge and skill. If we can ascertain the knowledge and skill of individuals, that should be our basis for hiring and placement.

Worse still, as in the Benton case, accreditation reinforced by federal and state statutes and regulations harnesses public power to the likes and dislikes of government bureaucrats.

I regard specialized (often called “national” or “professional”) accreditation as a horse with a different hide, for it often relieves institutions of pressure to seek regional accreditation, and many specialized accrediting agencies, far from pretending to certify the excellence of institutions in some cosmic sense, will say, when approving a particular institution or a special program within an institution, that it is a fitting representation of “our type” of institution or program. Criteria of adequacy are still problematic, but probably manageable if accreditors make sensible assertions.

The Oregon legislature, learning what wonders Contreras had wrought with BJU’s lack of accreditation, nullified his actions. The state attorney then argued that the Benton case should be dropped. The judge, impressed by the contrary argument of Benton’s lead attorney, said the case must move into a second phase, focusing on Benton’s constitutional rights, not the merits of accreditation.

I lost my chance to testify on regional accreditation’s muddled logic. (The nation needs a test case in this regard.) I was gratified, however, when the judge, having read my deposition in the first phase of the case, went to great lengths to accommodate my scheduling problems in the second phase. With the judge’s assent, the lead attorney led me through my testimony in a Los Angeles hotel room that was connected via conference telephone and video camera to the courtroom in Eugene, Oregon. In the courtroom the judge presided as usual while the attorney for Oregon, also present in the courtroom, raised multiple objections and cross-examined me, having deposed me earlier via conference telephone.

The judge ruled that Benton’s constitutional rights had been violated, and he noted, perhaps in response to my testimony, that BJU was a serious academic institution, not a diploma mill. Because Benton had not demonstrated financial losses, she got the token dollar in damages that is customary in such circumstances.

Some developments in the second phase were amusing. The state attorney argued that prohibiting mention of unaccredited degrees without a disclaimer was not unconstitutional interference with free speech because mentioning degrees is commercial speech, which has no particular constitutional protection. I found it easy, of course, to explain how degrees are often discussed with no discernible commercial implications. The state attorney argued that Contreras had simply engaged in a good-faith effort to protect Oregon citizens against people with flawed degrees. I testified about counting 786 foreign degrees of unknown quality, listed in Oregon college catalogs, that Contreras had ignored, including degrees from Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. The state attorney argued that Contreras, badly overworked, did not have time to find out about BJU and its reasons for not being accredited. I testified that in 34 seconds, without any pertinent prior knowledge, I had located the BJU website, which provided a substantial, commendably candid explanation of BJU’s unaccredited status.

(Benton’s lead attorney, who impressed me greatly, had suggested several aspects of my preparation for the second phase of the case.)

I was not in court to hear Michael Scriven, a scholar whom I have known and respected for many years, but I understand he gave compelling testimony.

The lead attorney wrote me, at the conclusion of the case: “Your testimony was very impressive, very effective, and very incisive. The best measure of that was when the judge said to the other side, when they said they were going to cross-examine you further, ‘I wouldn’t ask him much, because the more that man testifies, the less progress your side makes.’” I will rush you a photocopy of the lead attorney’s letter if you so request.

The case may have triggered a lasting national effect, not merely a temporary local one. In the summer of 2004, Alan Contreras, whose influence was growing, assisted a Congressional committee on educational fraud. Approximately that same time, in a well publicized Internet discussion sponsored by Chronicle of Higher education he was asked about the connection between accreditation and educational fraud. Some reputable institutions choose to forego accreditation, he responded, citing Bob Jones University as an outstanding example. Those certainly were not his views before the Benton case.

<previous (Long Beach) next (General qualifications)>

(or select from the links on left or top of page)

Published with the assistance of IEW Systems